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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003985

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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [MOPS](#) [MARR](#) [IZ](#)
SUBJECT: S/I SATTERFIELD, CG, AND CDA DISCUSS UNSCR,
DETAINEES, BASRAH GOVERNOR, AND YELLOWCAKE WITH PM

REF: BAGHDAD 3940

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Classified By: CDA Patricia Butenis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

11. (S) Summary: S/I Satterfield took the opportunity of the regular weekly meeting between PM Maliki and Multi-National Force-Iraq Commanding General Petraeus (CG) and Embassy COM (CDA Butenis) to press PM Maliki to sign his (Maliki's) letter to the UN Security Council (UNSC) requesting a UNSCR authorizing MNF-I for 2008 - it must be done today he insisted. A swift, clean, and simple renewal of the UN mandate is needed. Satterfield reminded Maliki that he had indicated to Deputy Secretary Negroponte on December 1 (reftel) and to Secretary of Defense Gates on December 4 (septel) the essential agreement on the way forward already existed. Maliki concurred, and told his advisor to get it done in their next meeting with S/I Satterfield - agreeing that no more than an hour should be needed to finish the text. CG raised with Maliki his at times very difficult relations with Basrah Governor Wa'eli, which Maliki reported were now in order. CDA outlined plans for resolving the issue of the Tuwaitha nuclear research facility's Yellowcake. End Summary.

UNSCR Letter

12. (S/NF) Before the meeting began, S/I Ambassador David Satterfield told National Security Advisor (NSA) Muwaffaq Rubaie that he (Satterfield) would raise with PM Maliki the need to sign the Iraqi PM's letter to the UNSC that day. He told Rubaie that it was essential to have a quick, clean process of renewing the mandate given other issues looming on the UNSC calendar. Satterfield reminded Rubaie that the PM had concurred with Deputy Secretary John D. Negroponte on December 1 and with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates on December 4 that signing a good letter was urgent. They had also agreed that an immediately subsequent letter from POTUS to Maliki would serve to allay concerns that the Iraqi side had. He underlined the point that POTUS stands ready to sign his letter as soon as he receives word that Maliki has signed his letter to the UNSC.

13. (S/NF) NSA Rubaie responded that he understood the need for urgency, mentioning that he planned to be out of the country over the next two days and therefore wished to reach agreement on a final text this evening, switching to "this afternoon" when Satterfield reminded him of the matter's urgency. Rubaie also raised the spectre of continued negotiations on the question of detention

authorities for MNF-I, while agreeing that the PM had concurred with Negroponte and Gates that the UNSCR should not be re-opened for debate.

¶4. (S/NF) Ambassador Satterfield presented the same points to PM Maliki, underlining the absolute need for a swift, clean renewal of MNF-I's mandate under the UNSCR. He stressed that the letter in its current formulation, and POTUS's letter to the PM, were consistent with that intention.

PM: Let's Finish This

¶5. (S/NF) Maliki took the points and stated that the UNSCR would not be re-opened. He stated that the combined interest of the two nations, as well as the word of POTUS were the guarantors that the implementation of the UNSCR over the course of 2008 would go well. He noted that he had told POTUS that he (Maliki) had always wanted to show people the benefits of success. He had his people on board now.

¶6. (S/NF) Concurring with the PM, Ambassador Satterfield noted that the greatest guarantor of cooperation is the relationship of trust between the two nations. Urging quick action to wrap up the texts, he told Maliki that the issue of Kosovo will soon be on the agenda for the UNSC - action on the UNSCR for Iraq must be completed before the Kosovo debate comes up. He emphasized that the letter must reach the UNSC no later than tomorrow (December 7). The White House is ready to have POTUS sign the letter to Maliki as soon as the Maliki to UNSC letter is signed. He reiterated that these two letters reflect the PM's position and address the concerns raised by the Iraqi side - but closure is needed today. Can I inform the White House it

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will be finished
tonight, he asked.

¶7. (S/REL UK AS) Maliki assured Satterfield that the letter to the UNSC would be finished that day, indicating that no more than an hour should be needed to finish up the final edits. Indicating his team of advisors, he told Satterfield that they would meet with him and finish it. He later returned to this point, using a story of the second Caliph's locking of six advisors in a room to tell NSA Rubaie, "Meet and don't leave the room until you finish."

Detentions

¶8. Maliki indicated that one measure of success he could demonstrate to the Iraqi people would be the release of detainees that no longer presented a threat to security of Iraqis or Coalition Forces. General Petraeus noted that MNF-I had already started releasing such detainees in MNF-I custody. Maliki applauded this, adding that his own thinking on this had changed - not due to political pressure he insisted, but because now was the right time to proceed with amnesty for those not guilty of serious crimes. He also suggested a large release or very public announcement of releases would be a good idea. CG noted the logistic difficulties with a massive release, but stated that publicity on the releases would be expanded and his staff was already working on such a public relations strategy. Maliki wrapped up by noting this would be a proper amnesty, not like Saddam's release of criminals, but with money and other support of released detainees to mitigate against recidivism.

Basrah Governor Wa'eli

¶9. (S/REL UK AS) CG broached the situation in Basrah, and asked Maliki about his meeting with Governor Wa'eli. (Note: Maliki's efforts to remove Wa'eli from office were turned back by the courts. End note.) First noting that the media was allowed to film Wa'eli and Maliki meeting, to enhance Wa'eli's status Maliki opined, the PM stated that he had had very tough, very candid talks with Basrah's governor. Maliki said that he had reminded Wa'eli of the importance of Basrah - for that reason, security there is paramount, and therefore the army will remain in charge of security. The days of one-party rule are over, likewise for quotas of offices for parties. All government representatives work for the good of all. The PM said that all the parties in Basrah had reached agreement to isolate gangsters and criminal, and then eliminate them. Summing up, Maliki called it a good meeting, noting that Wa'eli had promised to get it right and work to undo the perception of corruption around him and his family.

¶10. (S/REL UK AS) NSA Rubaie interjected that Wa'eli had agreed to 3 promises:
--to foster National Reconciliation in Basrah by allowing all parties into the process of governance, not just his own Fadhila party
--to fight corruption no matter who was involved (Note: Wa'eli denied PM's allegations of corruption. End Note.)
--to dissolve militias, starting with his own Fadhila party militia in the Petroleum Facilities Protection Service (FPS). Rubaie added that Wa'eli had two months to accomplish these promises.

¶11. (S/REL UK AS) The PM stated that he would monitor Wa'eli's progress, adding that it was important to focus on criminal gangs and on inter-tribal violence related to criminal activity. He cited the example of two southern Iraqi tribes that have been fighting for over 60 years. He confirmed that Governor Wa'eli would sign the Basrah Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) MOU on behalf of the province; CG confirmed that the Provincial Iraqi Control ceremony would take place on December 16.

Tuwaitha Yellowcake

¶12. (S/REL MNF) CDA outlined options for resolving the issue of 550 metric tons of Yellowcake stored at the

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Tuwaitha Nuclear research facility. She described two scenarios for the GOI to choose from - sell it to foreign buyers, two of who have been tentatively identified, or move it abroad for temporary storage. The potential buyers would be in Paris later this month and were interested in meeting with Iraqi experts on this matter. The CG added that the secure movement of this large quantity, approximately 550 metric tons, is best done while the large number of forces are present in Iraq. Maliki took the points and asked the CDA to provide his technical experts charged with this matter with written information so that they could proceed to resolve this matter with MNF-I support.

Paris Conference

¶13. (C/REL MNF) Ambassador Satterfield advised the PM that Iraqi attendance at the December 17 Palestinian Authority Donors' Conference in Paris would help Iraq to expand its visibility in the greater Middle East. This was a follow-up to the Annapolis conference. Representation at a high-level was less important than being there - the presence of the Iraqi Ambassador to France or his Deputy would suffice. Maliki made no commitment, but showed increased interest when informed that no pledge of

financial support would be expected.
BUTENIS